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Professional Liability of Lawyers in Pennsylvania
H. Reginald Belden*
H. Reginald Belden, Jr.**
Marcia Belden Lappas*
In the past decade, the bar, and especially the trial bar, has become
keenly aware of the problems relating to the professional liability of
medical doctors, osteopaths, and other practitioners of the healing arts.
The number of medical malpractice suits, particularly against surgeons,
has multiplied during that period of time. The verdicts in medical
malpractice actions and the settlements arising out of such actions have
been headlined in the newspapers in various parts of the country. While
the law of medical malpractice has been developing into something of
a specialty among some members of the trial bar, and while the bar
generally has developed a familiarity with the problems relating to
medical malpractice, little attention has been given its counterpart in
the legal profession-the responsibility of lawyers for professional neg-
ligence.
While a survey of the literature reveals a fair number of articles in
law reviews in a number of states, there is a paucity of information in
Pennsylvania on the subject of the liability of lawyers for professional
errors and omissions. It will be the purpose of this discussion to present
to the bar of Pennsylvania the posture of the law in Pennsylvania
relating to this subject, as compared with the law in other states, and,
in some respects, as compared with the law in Pennsylvania relating to
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medical malpractice. The recent rise in the cost of purchasing profes-
sional liability insurance in Pennsylvania demonstrates the need for
such a survey. Illustrative of this need is a Bulletin issued by the
Pennsylvania Bar Association on December 1, 1971, where the following
statistics appeared:
DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS, the insurance carrier hand-
ling the professional liability insurance program sponsored by the
PBA Insurance Fund Trustees has alone handled 231 PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY CLAIMS FILED AGAINST PENNSYL-
VANIA LAWYERS. To date, $379,000 HAS BEEN PAID OUT
on these claims, and the TOTAL INCURRED AMOUNT for
these claims (amounts paid, plus costs, plus reserves for the pending
claims) during this period HAS REACHED THE SUM OF
$820,000.' (Emphasis in original).
Admittedly there are no known statistics on the number of claims
handled by carriers other than the one chosen by the PBA Insurance
Fund Trustees to handle the group coverage for the Pennsylvania Bar
Association. Similarly, there is no known record of the number of
malpractice claims actually litigated. An examination of the digests
and cases, however, points up the fact that lawyers in Pennsylvania
cannot afford to be impervious to the danger of suits against them for
professional negligence.
Before examining the various aspects of liability of attorneys for
professional negligence, several related matters deserve brief mention.
First, there has been some discussion in legal periodicals concerning
the appropriateness of the term "malpractice" in connection with negli-
gent conduct by lawyers in their professional capacity. The question
has arisen, no doubt, because legal periodicals and digests seem to re-
strict the term "malpractice" almost exclusively to cases concerning the
medical profession, while information and cases regarding the negli-
gence of an attorney are generally found under headings such as "Legal
Profession-Negligence," or "Attorneys-Negligence." 2 Notwithstand-
ing this fact, however, our research has indicated, and writers have con-
cluded,3 that the term is equally applicable to the medical and legal
professions, and it generally is defined as negligent conduct or lack of
professional care or skill. The only time a real problem arises is in those
1. Bulletin issued by the Pennsylvania Bar Association headquarters to all Pennsylvania
lawyers, December 1, 1971.
2. See Porter, Legal Malpractice in Pennsylvania, 37 PA. BAR ASS'N Q. 46 (1965).
3. Id.; Tallin, Liability of Professional Men for Negligence and Malpractice, 3 CANADIAN
BAR J. 230, 231 (1960).
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jurisdictions whose legislatures have enacted a "malpractice" statute.
In such states, the terminology may be determinative of the appropriate
statute of limitations, 4 but no such problem exists in Pennsylvania.
It is the purpose of this article to consider only those cases which
directly relate to an attorney's negligence or lack of care or skill. We
will not discuss an attorney's liability in regard to improper handling
of criminal actions, suits against attorneys for libel, slander or mali-
cious prosecution, or cases relating to patents, embezzlement, con-
version, contempt, or conflicts of interest. 5 We also necessarily exclude
ethics and grievance cases.
STANDARD OF CARE
When an attorney is considering the merits of an action against
another attorney, unquestionably the first factor to be considered is
whether the conduct of the prospective defendant-attorney has met the
required standard of care.
In determining the standard of care which a lawyer must employ
in representing his client, it is appropriate to consider, for comparison
purposes, the principles relating to the standard of care required of a
physician under the law of Pennsylvania. The principles relating to
actions for medical malpractice are delineated in Smith v. Yohe:6
(a) in the absence of a special contract, a physician neither warrants
a cure nor guarantees the result of his treatment ... ; (b) "A physi-
cian who is not a specialist is required to possess and employ in
the [diagnosis and] treatment of a patient the skill and knowledge
4. Baxter, Statutes of Limitations in Legal Malpractice, 18 CLEv.-MAR. L. RaV. 82, 83-4
(1969); Coggin, Attorney Negligence .. .A Suit Within A Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 225,
230-32 (1958).
5. Though not within the scope of this article, it seems important to note the sig-
nificance of the conflicts of interest area. Cases may arise, e.g., in which an attorney
represents both the insurer and the insured. Assuming that the insurer refuses to settle
within policy limits and counsel continues to represent both clients, would the attorney
then be liable to the plaintiff for an excess judgment? In regard to this area, it might be
of interest to know that at the American Bar Association 1972 Midyear Meeting in New
Orleans, Louisiana (February 7-8, 1972), the House of Delegates of the ABA approved the
agreement between the ABA and liability insurers, as follows:
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST GENERALLY-DUTIES OF ATTORNEY
In any claim or in any suit where the attorney selected by the company to defend
the claim or action becomes aware of facts or information which indicate to him
a question of coverage in the matter being defended or any other conflict of interest
between the company and the insured with respect to the defense of the matter,
the attorney should promptly inform both the company and the insured, preferably
in writing, of the nature and extent of the conflicting interest. In any such suit, the
company or its attorney should invite the insured to retain his own counsel at his
own expense to represent his separate interest.
6. 412 Pa. 94, 194 A.2d 167 (1963).
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usually possessed by physicians [of good standing] in the same or
a similar locality giving due regard to the advanced state of the pro-
fession at the time of the treatment; and in employing the required
skill and knowledge he is also required to exercise the care and
judgment of a reasonable man"...; (c) the burden of proof is upon
the plaintiff to prove either (1) that the physician did not possess
and employ the required skill or knowledge or (2) that he did not
exercise the care and judgment of a reasonable man in like circum-
stances . . .; (d) the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and exclusive
control are not applicable in this area of the law . . .; (e) in mal-
practice cases which involve an appraisal of the care and skill of a
physician a lay jury presumably lacks the necessary knowledge and
experience to render an intelligent decision without expert testi-
mony and must be guided by such expert testimony .. .; (f) the
only exception to the requirement that expert testimony must be
produced is "where the matter under investigation is so simple,
and the lack of skill or want of care so obvious, as to be within the
range of the ordinary experience and comprehension of even non-
professional persons" ... ; (g) a physician is not liable for an error
of judgment... ; (h) if a physician employs the required judgment
and care in arriving at his diagnosis, the mere fact that he erred
in his diagnosis will not render him liable, even though his treat-
ment is not proper for the condition that actually exists. . ..
Although the law in Pennsylvania relating to legal malpractice has
not crystallized to the same extent as in medical malpractice, somewhat
parallel standards were set out by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Enterline v. Miller.8
An attorney is not liable to his client for a failure to succeed,
resulting in loss to the client, unless this is due to his mismanage-
ment of the business intrusted to him, through bad faith, inatten-
tion or want of professional skill. Without discussing at length
the degree of skill and care required of an attorney, it is sufficient
for the purposes of the case in hand to say that he must, at least,
be familiar with the well-settled principles of law and rules of
practice which are of frequent application in the ordinary business
of the profession; must observe the utmost good faith toward his
client; and must give such attention to his duties, and to the
interests of his client, as ordinary prudence demands, or members
of the profession usually bestow. For loss to his client, resulting
from the lack of this measure of professional duty and attainments,
7. Id. at 98-99, 194 A.2d at 170-71. [Citations of cases omitted.]
8. 27 Pa. Super. 463 (1905). This, however, was not a malpractice case, but a suit by an
attorney to recover his fee.
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he must be held liable; and such loss forms an equitable defense
to his demand for compensation.9
In addition, with the ready availability of seminars on subjects of
general interest to the bar, with easy access of treatises and decisions
on almost any subject related to the general practice of law, and with
state-wide practice, it would seem that a Pennsylvania lawyer should
be obliged to keep abreast of his profession, and that if his failure to
do so causes loss or damage to a client, that failure would constitute
actionable professional negligence.
This, of course, leaves a number of unanswered questions: Is the
standard of care a matter of law which will be determined by the judge,
or is it a question of fact which is within the province of the jury? Is a
lawyer bound to the standard of care of lawyers of good standing in
his own community or a similar community, or in his own state? If the
standard of care to which the lawyer is bound is a question of fact, is
expert testimony either admissible or required to establish that stan-
dard?
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Black's Law Dictionary defines res ipsa loquitur as:
The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption that defen-
dant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality
causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the
accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of
negligence.' 0
The discussions in periodicals state that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur has not been applied to legal malpractice cases," and at least
one case in another jurisdiction has specifically held the doctrine is
not applicable to legal malpractice, 12 but .there is at least one comment
to the effect that it is the "next stop."'1 And, while the Pennsylvania
9. Id. at 467.
10. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1470 (4th ed. 1951).
11. Averill, Jr., Attorney's Liability To Third Persons For Negligent Malpractice, 2
LAND & WATER L. RF,. 379, 383 (1967); Wade, The Attorney's Liability For Negligence,.12
VAND. L. REv. 755, 766-67 (1959).
12. Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934).
13. Wallach & Kelly, Attorney Malpractice in California: A Shaky Citadel, I0 SANTA
CLARA LAWYER 257, 266 (1970). See also Comment, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COL. L. Rlv.
1292, 1312 (1963), where the author seems to be saying res ipsa should apply, without
using the words, when he says:
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courts hold that the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and exclusive control
are not applicable in medical malpractice cases, 14 it appears that they
may have applied the doctrine to legal malpractice without using the
term.
Perhaps the strongest evidence of this latter supposition is the case
of Lichow v. Sowers.' 5 The plaintiff alleged that he had hired the
defendant-attorney, paying him a retainer, for three specific purposes:
(a) to file an answer to a petition to show cause why attachment pro-
ceedings for contempt should not issue and to represent the plaintiff
at the hearing on the petition, (b) to file a petition to reinstate a former
petition to open a final decree which had been dismissed for want of
prosecution, and (c) to file a petition for insolvency if (a) and (b) failed.
The court, reversing a judgment of non-suit, held:
Defendant having accepted a retainer, and having agreed to file
certain petitions, he cannot, by a demurrer to the statement of
claim, raise the question as to whether they would have been effec-
tive. It became his duty to file them and to have their merits passed
upon by the court. 16
The defendant had not done any of the specific things which he al-
legedly agreed to do, and had sent an assistant, unfamiliar with the
facts, to represent the plaintiff at the contempt proceedings.
Has the court, by its language, done less than grant the plaintiff a
"rebuttable presumption"? The language of the court seems to fit
within the res ipsa test set forth in Skeen v. Stanley Co. of America."7
In Skeen the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania outlined the following
elements of the test: 1) an omission to observe some absolute duty; 2)
a contract relation, as in the case of the carrier who agrees to carry
safely; 3) sole control; and 4) an injury.' This is not to say that the
defendant cannot present evidence and have the court instruct the jury
that they are to consider all of the evidence to determine whether or
not there was negligence, for in the Skeen case the court went on to say:
Even in such instances, the legal conclusion [of liability] may be
The defendant [attorney] should be required to demonstrate that his choice of
alternatives, though subsequently revealed to be mistaken, was not unreasonable,
for only then is the allegation of negligence rebutted.
14. See accompanying text to note 7.
15. 334 Pa. 353, 6 A.2d 285 (1939).
16. Id. at 355, 6 A.2d at 286.
17. 362 Pa. 174, 66 A.2d 774 (1949).
18. Id. at 177, 66 A.2d at 775.
322
Vol. 10: 317, 1972
Professional Liability of Lawyers in Pennsylvania
rebutted by showing the accident was one which the utmost skill,
foresight, and diligence could not have prevented. 19
In the Lichow case there existed a duty upon the defendant-attorney,
a contract relation between the plaintiff and defendant, sole control
by the defendant and injury to the plaintiff. An argument could be
made in the Lichow case that the plaintiff would not have been able
to eliminate all other possible causes of his injury. ° This, of course,
would be a matter of proof.
Question of Law or Question of Fact
There are at least three types of cases in which the court, if not ap-
plying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, puts the plaintiff in an even
stronger position as to the burden of going forward with the evidence.
In the three areas to be discussed, we believe that the standard of
care is a question of law properly placed with the court. Unfortunately,
some of the cases are inconsistent as to whether the standard is a ques-
tion of law or one of fact.
1. Failing to Pay Over Money
The first area is the failure on the part of the attorney to pay over
the money he has collected for his client.
In the early case of McDowell v. Potter,2' it was assumed there was
a breach of duty when the attorney failed to turn over the money.
That court placed the burden of proof on the defendant to show that
either the client knew of the collection of the money, or that with
ordinary care and diligence the client would have known of it. The
rule was modified to some extent by Krause v. Dorrance2 as to the
time at which suit could be brought. It was held in Krause that the
action could not be brought until after a demand was made for the
money. Therefore, rather than the burden being on the defendant to
show actual or constructive notice of the collection to the client, the
burden was placed on the client-plaintiff to show a demand. However,
this does not change the assumption to the effect that the failure to
pay over the money was a breach of duty.
19. Id.
20. Norris v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 334 Pa. 161, 5 A.2d 114 (1939).
21. 8 Pa. 189 (1848).
22. 10 Pa. 462 (1849).
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In 1864 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, commenting on the failure
of an attorney to pay over money, said: "A breach of duty it un-
doubtedly was." 23 The holding of such failure as a matter of law con-
tinued through the case of Campbell's A dm'r. v. Boggs24 where the
court said: "[I]t is part of the attorney's duty to give prompt notice
of the collection of the money; it is neglect of that duty which renders
him liable to the action on the contract .... -25 The rule was reaffirmed
in 185726 and 1944.27
Even in this seemingly clear area, however, there is one case which
clouds the question. In Ramage v. Cohn28 the defendant-attorney was
engaged by the plaintiff and another to collect a debt, and instructed
by the plaintiff not to surrender the check until he received plaintiff's
share of the proceeds from the other creditor. The defendant surren-
dered the check to the other creditor, and the other creditor sent plain-
tiff only a part of plaintiff's share of the proceeds. A non-suit was
reversed by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania seemingly on the basis
that:
It was not a situation where the defendant was warranted in using
his own discretion; he had received express instructions what to
do .... "An attorney's duty, where he is specially instructed, is to
follow the instructions of his client, except as to matters of detail
connected with the conduct of the suit, and he is liable for all
losses resulting from his failure to follow such instructions with
reasonable promptness and care." 29
The conflict comes in the last paragraph where the court stated:
"Whether the defendant used the reasonable care that the circum-
stances required was eminently a question of fact for the jury's con-
sideration. '" 30 Quaere where an attorney is held to be duty bound to
follow special instructions given by his client and he fails to follow
those instructions, can it be said to be a question of fact as to whether
or not he was negligent?
23. Fleming v. Culbert, 46 Pa. 498, 500 (1864).
24, 48 Pa. 524 (1855).
25. Id. at 525.
26. McCoon v. Galbraith, 29 Pa. 293 (1857).
27. In Re Huffman's Estate, 349 Pa. 59, 36 A.2d 640 (1944).
28. 124 Pa. Super. 525, 189 A. 496 (1937).
29. Id. at 528, 189 A. 497-98 quotingfrom 6 C.J. Attorney" 5 Client § 234 (1916).
30. Id. at 529, 189 A. at 498.
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2. Negligence in Title Searching
The second area, one in which there is apparently no conflict as to
whether the standard to be applied is a question of law or fact, occurs
when there has been a failure to discover liens against realty by the
title searcher. The Pennsylvania courts31 have spoken in terms of a
breach of duty and, where that specific language is not used, there has
been an underlying assumption that the defendant-attorney 2 was neg-
ligent.
In the recent case of Zurich General Accident and Liability Ins. Co.
v. Klein,33 an attorney representing the purchasers of real estate, failed
to discover tax liens, and the purchasers were required to pay those
taxes. The court held that the plaintiff, insurer of the attorney, was
under a contractual duty to the attorney to pay the purchasers, his
clients. Thus, it seems, liability again was assumed by the court in the
underlying obligation between the attorney and his clients.
3. Missing the Statute of Limitations
The third area, perhaps the most analytically difficult of the three,
concerns the statute of limitations. This problem arises when the at-
torney has been hired to bring suit and fails to do so prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations.
In Moore v. Juvenal,34 where the defendant-attorney failed to bring
an action in equity against a railway company prior to the running of
the statute of limitations, the court assumed33 there was a negligent
breach of duty on the part of the attorney by stating:
It follows, therefore, that as soon as their claim against the railway
company was barred and lost, they had a right of action against
31. Spitzer v. Buten, 306 Pa. 536, 160 A. 444 (1932); Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37
A. 98 (1897); Owen v. Western Savings Fund, 97 Pa. 47, 39 A.R. 794 (1881); Bodine v. Wayne
Title & Trust Co., 33 Pa. Super. 68 (1906).
32. Though two of the cases, Owen v. Western Savings Fund, 97 Pa. 47, 39 A.R. 794
(1881), and Bodine v. Wayne Title & Trust Co., 33 Pa. Super. 68 (1906), did not involve
attorneys, the courts in those cases applied the same language or assumption and they are
sufficiently analogous to be determinative of the question.
33. 181 Pa. Super. 48, 121 A.2d 893 (1956).
34. 92 Pa. 484 (1880).
35. The assumption could be incorrect because the case was before the supreme court
on stipulated facts; however, see text accompanying note 37 infra.
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their attorney for any neglect of duty on his part, which resulted
in the loss then actually sustained. 36
Moreover, the court labeled the attorney's conduct as "dilatory. '3 7
Another case where the court considered the failure to bring suit
within the statute of limitations as a question of law was Rhines Adm'rs.
v. Evans in which the court said:
There were no facts, no circumstances to enable them [the jury]
to determine the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the delay
except the mere lapse of time, and this was fully within the knowl-
edge of the Court. It became, therefore, a question of law for the
Court to decide, and surely it is not a difficult question to deter-
mine, for no one could assert that it is reasonable the attorney
should delay 17 months without taking a step .... 3s
The Rhines case was decided upon a question of the statute of lim-
itations as a bar to the suit against the attorney. The attorney had
received a note for collection on February 10th, 1858, and suit was not
commenced against him until seven years, five months later. For the
plaintiff to come within the six year statute of limitations it was neces-
sary to show either that the attorney had been diligent for the first year
and five months, or that the attorney had somehow misled the plaintiff.
However, the attorney had done nothing during that period and the
plaintiff did nothing to inquire of him. It seems, though, from the
language of the court that had the statute not been a bar to the client's
action, the negligence of the attorney would have been treated as a
matter of law.
The earliest case in the statute of limitations area was McWilliams
v. Hopkins.3 9 In McWilliams the plaintiff, as administratrix, had hired
an attorney to bring suit against one who had embezzled funds from
the deceased. The attorney obtained judgment, but, through his al-
leged neglect, permitted the embezzler to escape because his bail was
insufficient. Plaintiff then hired defendant-attorney to sue the first
attorney. Defendant-attorney missed the statute of limitations. The
36. 92 Pa. 484 (1880).
37. Id. at 490. The quote ends "their attorney acted in good faith, but with mistaken
judgment." A judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto was affirmed on the basis
of a bar by the statute of limitations. However, it is curious that judgment n.o.v. was
affirmed on that basis when the lower court had instructed the jury to enter a verdict for
plaintiff on the negligence aspect of the case. It seems the lower court should have taken
the case from the jury on the basis of the bar of the statute rather than granting judg-
ment n.o.v.
38. 66 Pa. 192, 195-96 (1871).
39. 4 Rawle 382 (Pa. 1834).
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plaintiff would have failed in her original action against the embezzler
because her administration bond was faulty, only having one surety.
The court held that the defendant-attorney in this case could not take
advantage of the fact that the embezzler might have discovered the
defect in plaintiff's administration bond, thereby defeating plaintiff's
suit against the first attorney. The court held that the basis of the suit
against this defendant-attorney was not the grant of administration
but rather the duty which he owed the plaintiff that her action would
be conducted with reasonable diligence and skill.
However, on the question of negligence the court held:
She is not to be precluded therefore, if she can show negligence, in
this particular, in the original action [by the attorney hired to sue
the embezzler], as well as negligence by the defendant [in this case]
in prosecuting the original counsel for it.4°
Two cases before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, though not based
upon a failure to file suit prior to the running of the statute of lim-
itations, are so similar to that situation that they are worthy of our
consideration here. Both cases were between the same parties. The
second was an appeal from the new trial ordered as a result of the first.
The plaintiff had hired a lawyer to bring suit for him but the lawyer
neglected to do so. If there had been a timely suit the intended defen-
dant would not have been insolvent and could have paid any recovery
awarded by a jury. In Cox v. Livingston,41 the court made the negli-
gence of the attorney clearly a question of law where the jury found
that the client had not given the attorney discretion as to whether to
bring suit:
The jury, therefore, ought to have been instructed by the court, if
they came to this conclusion, and we do not see well from the evi-
dence how they could have avoided it, that notwithstanding they
might think that Mr. Livingston had omitted to bring a suit, solely
with a view to promote the interest of the plaintiff, yet he had
violated his engagement with and failed to perform his duty to
the plaintiff, in not having brought and prosecuted a suit with
reasonable diligence for the recovery of the debt due to the plain-
tiff; and having thus failed to perform his duty, he had rendered
himself liable to pay to the plaintiff whatever of the debt might
have been recovered of Dubbs by suit having been brought and
prosecuted, which Dubbs has now become unable to pay; and that
it was the duty of the jury to find a verdict in favour of the plain-
40. Id. at 382.
41. 2 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841).
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tiff for that sum, whatever they should think it was. But if from
the evidence they should be of the opinion, that a suit brought
against Dubbs would have been unavailing, and that nothing could
have been recovered by means of it, their verdict, though it ought
still be for the plaintiff, should only be for nominal damages.42
The court, therefore, left to the jury only the question as to the dis-
cretion which the client had given the attorney. This was a stick which
the court used to muddy the water in Livingston v. Cox, 48 when the
case came round again. In that case, the court discussed whether the
action against an attorney should be on a theory ex contractu or ex
delicto and said:
Although not at all times obvious, the distinction seems to be
between misfeasance, which imports in itself a wrong without ref-
erence to contract, and non-feasance, being the violation of an ob-
ligation by a neglect or refusal to fulfill its requirements. [B]ut
at present, it is scarcely necessary to trouble ourselves with these
shades of difference; for it is obvious the present is an action in
form as well as in substance, upon a contract, specially and circum-
stantially set out in the plaintiff's declaration, and necessarily so
too, for I take it, it is only on this ground an action can be main-
tained against a negligent attorney .... 44
If an action against a negligent attorney can be maintained only on
a theory of contract and, according to Cox v. Livingston, the jury is to
determine whether or not the client gave the attorney any discretion-
which would be one of the elements of the contract-what is the po-
sition of the injured client whose lawyer negligently abused the dis-
cretion given to him by his client? To avoid the possibility of a non-suit,
must the client proceed in his pleadings and at the trial on the alterna-
tive theories that he did not give his attorney such discretion as would
permit him not to bring suit or, that if the jury find that such discre-
tion was given, the attorney negligently abused it? Unfortunately, these
questions remain unanswered in Pennsylvania.
A case which does not fit within any of the above three areas, but
which should be mentioned on the question of whether the standard
is to be measured by the jury or the court, is Miller v. Wilson.45 There,
the plaintiff had judgments against property owned by her sisters, and
the husband of one of her sisters undertook to pay the judgment
42. Id. at 106.
43. 6 Pa. 360 (1847).
44. Id. at 363.
45. 24 Pa. 114 (1854).
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through his mortgage-secured bond. The defendant was hired and paid
to prepare the papers, satisfy the judgments with a power of attorney,
and record the mortgage. He satisfied the jugments but failed to record
the mortgage until after other liens had been entered against the
property. The plaintiff's brother-in-law became insolvent and the only
security she had was his worthless bond. The court said:
The defendant's counsel thinks that he should not pay for the
great injury which his neglect has occasioned. The Court of
Common Pleas and the jury thought otherwise, and we are of
the same mind.46
The opinion in the Miller case contains some colorful language
which emphasizes the court's opinion that the negligence of the attorney
was strictly a matter of law.
Moving from the areas where the standard is, or should be, a matter
of law for the court to determine, there are some areas in which the
question as to whether the attorney's conduct met the standard of care
should be a question for the jury. Davis v. Associated Indem. Corp.47
so held. There, the defendant-attorney was brought on the record as
a third-party defendant by plaintiff's insurance company. Plaintiff had
suffered a verdict which his insurance company refused to pay. The
allegation was that the defendant-attorney failed to file a motion for
new trial. The court, while sustaining a motion for judgment on the
pleadings in favor of the defendant on another issue,48 held that the
questions of want of skill, knowledge or due care or liability for an
honest mistake were questions of facts for the jury.
Expert Testimony
Where the standard of care is for the jury, the question arises as to
whether expert testimony is necessary to permit a plaintiff to recover
in an action against a lawyer who has represented him. This question
has been answered in the affirmative in Illinois. In Dorf v. Reeles49
the defendant-attorney was alleged to have failed to discuss a settlement
offer with his client (the plaintiff) and to conduct proper settlement
negotiations. The court held the law in Illinois required expert testi-
46. Id. at 120.
47. 56 F. Supp. 541 (M.D. Pa. 1944).
48. There was no allegation against the attorney as third party defendant that thejudgment against plaintiff was incorrect or would have been reversed on appeal (i.e., that
a new trial would have been granted). Hence, no damages.
49. 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966).
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mony for a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case against an attorney
whom he charged with professional negligence. The court cited Olson
v. North,50 equating the requirement for expert testimony in legal
malpractice cases to the requirement in actions for medical malpractice.
Other states have held that: expert testimony is unnecessary; 51 is "some-
times" needed; 52 is admissible;53 the question of want of skill is a
question of law for the court.54 These various rules have been the sub-
ject of a number of discussions in legal periodicals. 55
There are several Pennsylvania cases which have some bearing in
this area, though perhaps not specifically referring to expert testimony.
In Watson v. Muirhead5 the defendant-conveyancer had advised the
plaintiff that title was free and clear. The defendant presented evidence
from two persons. The witnesses indicated that in their opinion a
judgment on unliquidated damages did not constitute a lien. It appears
that the men were experts in the area and the court. affirming a judg.
ment for the defendant, said:
[I]n addition, it appears that having been previously employed
to investigate the same title, he [defendant] had submitted it to
eminent counsel, who had given a written opinion in its favor
without even expressing a doubt as to the judgment in ques-
tion .... 57
The court seemed to approve the use of expert testimony by saying:
"Therefore, an attorney ought not to be liable in case of a reasonable
doubt.... "58 The court said further:
No attorney, . . is bound to know all the law; God forbid that
it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a
Judge, is bound to know all the law; or that an attorney is to lose
his fair recompense on account of an error, being such an error as
a cautious man might fall into .... 59
The inference of approving expert testimony can be drawn from
50. 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934).
51. Surity v. Lelner, 155 So. 2d 831 (Fla. App. 1963).
52. Pennington's Exer's. v. Yell, 11 Ark. 212 (1850).
53. Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 18 A. 698 (1879); Central Cab. Co., v. Clarke, 259
Md. 542, 270 A.2d 662 (1970).
54. Gamber v. Hart, 44 Ga. 542 (1872).
55. Averill, Jr., supra note 11; Wade, supra note 11; Wallach & Kelly, supra, note 13;
Comment, supra, note 13; 43 IND. L. J. 771 (1968); 15 HASTINGS L.J. 584 (1964).
56. 57 Pa. 161 (1868).
57. Id. at 168.
58. Id. at 167.
59. Id. at 168.
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the language: "such an error as a cautious man might fall into," because
only experts in the area could inform a lay jury as to which errors
might be fallen into by even a cautious man.
In a later case, Wain v. Beaver,60 where the defendant-attorney failed
to collect a full debt secured by mortgage and bond against property
prior to the time that the property was sold at a tax sale, the court
approved the charge of the lower court to the effect that:
It was for them [the attorneys] to show you by evidence that what
they did was properly done; and that they did all that was required
of them as attorneys to prevent the loss of the claim. If they have
failed to do so, and if it appears from the evidence that the loss
of the claim was due to their negligence, then the verdict should
be for the plaintiff.
[I]f the jury are satisfied from all the evidence that the defendants,
or either of them, knew of the tax sale of the lands in controversy,
then it was their duty to inform the plaintiffs in reasonable time
thereafter, and before the time of redemption had expired, of the
tax sale. If they did not do so, then they were negligent as attorneys,
and are responsible for the loss or damage which resulted there-
from.
Even if the jury are satisfied from the evidence that the defendant
did not have actual knowledge of the tax sale, they would be
responsible, if the evidence satisfies the jury that they should have
known it, as attorneys for the plaintiffs.61
The plaintiff presented expert testimony of other members of the
bar who testified that when claims secured by mortgages were sent
to them they regarded it as their duty to look for unpaid taxes and to
watch the sales and notify their clients of the facts. The court found
nothing in the evidence that indicated the attorney-defendants in Wain
had done that.62
In a later case, Points v. Gibboney,63 the plaintiff-attorney had
entered judgment against the defendant and others and the court
below opened the judgment as to all defendants except appellant. The
appellant had signed certain judgment notes as executrix of her
60. 161 Pa. 605 (1894).
61. Id. at 607.
62. In addition, the court cited evidence at trial concerning the knowledge the de-
fendants had of the mortgage; what would divest the lien of the mortgage; the fact that
they took newspapers in which the tax sales were published; that one of them was at the
sale; that they had access to the mortgage of record near their office; and that a great
deal of land is sold for taxes.
63. 340 Pa. 522, 17 A.2d 365 (1941).
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husband's estate. The plaintiff-attorney then induced the executrix and
the other defendants to sign a judgment note to him assuming the
debts of the estate as individuals. In remanding the case with direc-
tions to open the judgments as to all defendants, including appellant,
the court stated:
The burden is upon him, as attorney, to show that he did not gain
a personal advantage by misrepresenting the legal situations or by
failing to make it plain to those whom it was his duty to advise
and protect. There is little, if anything, in the evidence to indicate
that he fulfilled that duty, nor was this aspect of the case apparently
considered by the court. While he testified that he constantly cau-
tioned appellant not to use her personal funds for the payment
of debts of the estate, it seemed strange that he ignored this
advice in the instance where his own claim was concerned and
induced her to assume just such a personal liability.64
The court seemed to urge the defendant to present expert testimony
to show that what he did was proper.
What rule as to expert testimony should prevail in connection with
certain matters of local practice? It is well known that in small counties,
where every lawyer knows every other lawyer, it is common practice
to grant extensions of time to opposing counsel for the filing of plead-
ings. Would it be necessary to present expert testimony on this point
in Pennsylvania?
From the language contained in Lynch v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Barton;65 it seems that it would not:
[T]he attorney is in some degree the agent as well as the lawyer
of the plaintiffs; when execution has issued, he often gives time
to the defendant, and directs the Sheriff to postpone a sale ad-
vertised; and so far as I know, this has always been taken as a
justification to the Sheriff for not selling. Such discretionary powers
are necessary for plaintiff's interest: Without the exercise of them,
many times, and under many circumstances, property, sufficient
to pay the debt, would not sell for enough to pay the costs. 66
There are, of course, other areas where perhaps expert testimony
should be used if, through such testimony, it can be shown that the
area of the law is not free from doubt as to what defendant-attorney
should have done. For, as was stated in Enterline v. Miller,6 7 an attorney
64. Id. at 527, 17 A.2d at 367.
65. 16 S. &c R. 367 (Pa. 1827).
66. Id. at 368.
67. 27 Pa. Super. 463 (1905).
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will not be held for a mistake where "the question is not so free
from doubt that an attorney must be required to decide it correctly,
on pain of being held lacking in professional knowledge should the
courts reach a different conclusion." 68
Similarly, a lawyer will not be held liable for what is a poor result
rather than negligence. 69 A lawyer is not bound to bring every suit
which his client may have, unless there is an express understanding
that he is to bring a particular action or actions,7 0 and an attorney will
not be held liable for the failure to do an act which he did not assume
to do.71
We may compare the language in Smith v. Yohe,72 a medical mal-
practice case, with the rules announced in the cases involving legal
malpractice hereinabove discussed. We have seen that just as a physician
does not warrant a cure or guarantee the result of his treatment, neither
does a lawyer guarantee the result of a case which he litigates or the
advice followed by his client. Pennsylvania seems to encourage expert
testimony where the standard of care required is not so clear as to be a
question of law or where the jury would lack sufficient knowledge to
determine the question-which is substantially similar to the rule
governing medical malpractice cases. As in medical malpractice cases
the burden is upon the plaintiff; however, the lawyer may have the
burden of going forward with the evidence in certain cases where either
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (not applied in medical malpractice)
or a violation of the standard of care is a matter of law. Furthermore,
the lawyer, as the physician, is required to exercise skill and knowledge
as well as the due care usually exercised by members of the profession.
PRIVITY73
An attorney hired by a dissatisfied client to bring suit against an
attorney about whose representation the client complains must first
determine that the previous attorney's conduct has not met the required
68. Id. at 469.
69. Harkness v. Caven, 199 Pa. 267, 48 A. 1080 (1901).
70. Youngman v. Miller, 98 Pa. 196 (1881).
71. Merrill v. Norton, 2 Walk. 213 (Pa. 1885).
72. 412 Pa. 911, 194 A.2d 167 (1963). See text accompanying note 7, supra.
73. Due to the paucity of Pennsylvania cases on the subject of an attorney's liability
to third persons, it seemed more desirable to consider the question of privity separately
and at length instead of including it under the discussion of Defenses. In this way we hope
to inform the reader of the present status of the law in other jurisdictions as some in-
dication of the direction in which the courts have been moving in this area.
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standard of care. He must next determine whether or not such a rela-
tionship existed between the client and the previous lawyer as will
permit the client to assert a cause of action against him.
Most professional negligence actions against attorneys arise directly
from the attorney-client relationship. It is well recognized, however,
that in the handling of certain legal matters an attorney's negligent
conduct might easily affect or injure persons outside that relationship.
Until recently,74 however, such "third persons" 75 have had no remedy
against the negligent attorney because courts consistently have invoked
the traditional rule that an attorney is liable for negligence only to
persons in privity with him.76 The reason for this unswerving adherence
to the privity doctrine over the years seems to be a reluctance of the
courts to impose an undue burden or unpredictable liability upon
attorneys.7 7 In other areas of consumer services, however, the doctrine
of privity either has been abolished, or is rapidly collapsing.78 It was
almost inevitable, considering the complexities of modem practice,
that the doctrine eventually would break down in the area of pro-
fessional negligence also, and, to some extent, it has.
There has been an increasing number of actions by third parties
against attorneys in recent years, and they arise most frequently in
the areas of title searches79 and drafting of wills.8 0 Although, the law
has developed more clearly in the area of negligence in drafting wills,
it is necessary to consider the cases in both areas for complete under-
standing of both the history and present status of the law. The first
court to hand down an opinion in regard to the doctrine of privity in
this type of action was the House of Lords. 81 In 1861, Lord Campbell
stated that he "never had any doubt of the unsoundness of the doctrine"
that the third party could recover stating: "I am clearly of the opinion
that this is not the law of Scotland, nor of England, and it can hardly
74. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 987 (1962).
75. Averill, Jr., supra note 11.
76. National Savings Bank of the District of Columbia v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879)
[hereinafter cited as Savings Bank v. Ward]; Jacobsen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 11
F.R.D. 97, 100 (E.D. N.Y. 1950); Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND.
L. REv. 755, 758-59 (1959).
77. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589, 364 P.2d 685, 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824; Com-
ment, supra note 13, at 1311.
78. MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co.,
191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
79. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
80. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 987 (1962); Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895).
81. Robertson v. Fleming, 4 Macq. 167 (H.L. Sc. 1861).
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be the law of any country where jurisprudence has been cultivated as
a science. ' '8 2
The Supreme Court of the United States considered the question
in 1879, when it handed down its landmark decision in National Sav-
ings Bank of the District of Columbia v. Ward (hereinafter referred to
as Savings Bank). 3 There, plaintiff bank filed suit against an attorney
for professional malpractice, alleging negligence in the examination
and certification of title to real estate. The title examination had been
requested and paid for by the purported owner of the property for the
purpose of securing a loan. Plaintiff alleged that in reliance on the
attorney's certificate of title, it made a loan to the supposed owner.
Apparently, the owner had transferred title to the property prior to
the loan; thus the trust-deed to plaintiff proved to be valueless. It was
alleged, and conceded, that the prior recorded deed would have been
discovered by proper investigation. The Court, however, directed its
attention to the question of privity of contract in holding:
Beyond all doubt, the general rule is that the obligation of the
attorney is to his client and not to a third party, and unless there
is something in the circumstances of this case to take it out of that
general rule, it seems clear that the proposition of the defendant
must be sustained.84
The lower court found as a matter of fact there had been no contract
and no communication between the plaintiff and the attorney, and it
directed a verdict and entered judgment for the defendant. The
Supreme Court affirmed this judgment, having found no "special cir-
cumstances'' 85 to warrant recovery. In making its decision, the Court
relied primarily on the English precedent86 mentioned above.
The Supreme Court of California was the next to consider a similar
problem in Buckley v. Gray.8 7 The Buckley court adhered to the re-
quirement of privity of contract before plaintiff could maintain an
action against the attorney. Buckley was a legatee under his mother's
will, which defendant-attorney prepared. Defendant negligently had
Buckley witness the will, thus invalidating his legacy. The Buckley
82. Id. at 177.
83. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
84. Id. at 200. The "special circumstances" to which the Court referred included fraud,
collusion and an act of negligence that would be imminently dangerous to the lives of
others. Id. at 203-04.
85. See note 84.
86. Robertson v. Fleming, 4 Macq. 167 (H.L. Sc. 1861); Fish v. Kelly, 144 Eng. Rep. 78
(C.P. 1864).
87. 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895).
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court relied on Savings Bank v. Ward"8 in holding that the doctrine
of privity was firmly established. Significantly, the court also held that
the privity doctrine would not be circumvented on a third party
beneficiary theory since the contract was not expressly for the plaintiff's
benefit.8 9
It was not until 1922 that the privity rule was again challenged,
this time in the New York courts. In Glanzer v. Shepard,90 a case not
involving negligence of an attorney, the Court of Appeals of New York
distinguished Saving Bank v. Ward, and found that the question at bar
was a question of duty, not contract or privity.9' In affirming a directed
verdict for the plaintiff, Chief Judge Cardozo stated that "one who
follows a common calling may come under a duty to another whom he
serves, though a third may give the order or make payment,"9 2 thus
indicating that in a proper case, an attorney would no longer be able
to hide behind the privity rule.
Later, in 1931, in Ultrameres Corp. v. Touche9 3 the Court of Appeals
of New York again considered the privity doctrine in an action against
accountants for negligence in certifying a balance sheet. As in Glanzer,
the court based its decision on the concept of duty, but distinguished
Glanzer on the facts, 94 and thus was able to deny recovery to the plain-
tiff. Recovery was denied even though plaintiff was within the group
of persons defendants knew would rely on their certificate and
even though plaintiff had a right to rely on the certificate. The court
felt this case involved simply a negligent misstatement, and that the
concept of duty should not be extended so far9" as to put an undue
burden on the accounting and other professions. Of the Ultrameres
decision, one writer has said: "Notwithstanding this thesis, the Ultra-
meres decision, if it did not kill the effectiveness of Glanzer, certainly
took the punch out of it."96
Finally, in 1958, the Supreme Court of California confronted the
88. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
89. 110 Cal. 339, 342-43, 42 P. 900, 901-02. California had a statute providing: "A con-
tract made expressly for the benefit of a third person may be enforced by him at any time
before the parties thereto rescind it." Cal. Civ. Code § 1559 (West 1954).
90. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
91. Id., 135 N.E. at 276.
92. Id.
93. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
94. Id. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
95. It is important to note, however, that the extent of liability in the two cases differed
greatly. The damages alleged in Glanzer were small, in terms of dollars but in Ultrameres,
the damages alleged were much greater. The amount of damages, of course, should not
control the outcome.
96. Averill, Jr., supra note 11, at 391.
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issue squarely, and rejected the stringent privity testy7 In Biakanja
v. Irving the court was presented with an action against a notary public
who, though unauthorized to practice law, drafted a will which was
later declared invalid because of improper attestation. The court held
that defendant was liable in tort to an intended beneficiary who suf-
fered a loss as the result of the invalidity of the will. The duty concept
was the basis of the court's decision, and it announced a test which
was to be used in this and future cases of a similar nature. The language
of the court is as follows:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will
be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy
and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of pre-
venting future harm.98
After Biakanja, there remained only one question: would that hold-
ing be limited to its factual situation, i.e., a case in which the defendant
was violating a statute such as one prohibiting practicing law without a
license? This question was soon answered by the Supreme Court of
California in its landmark decision of Lucas v. Hamm.99 Defendant-
attorney in Lucas was employed by the testator to draft a will. Plain-
tiffs were beneficiaries under a residuary trust set forth in the will, and
after testator's death, it became apparent that the trust provision
violated several of California's Civil Code provisions. The trust sub-
sequently was attacked, and defendant advised plaintiffs to settle, re-
ducing their share under the trust by $75,000.00. This is the amount
that plaintiffs alleged as damages. Plaintiffs' complaint sounded in both
tort and contract (based on a third party beneficiary theory). Chief
Justice Gibson affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the action on the
ground that as a matter of law the defendant's error was neither negli-
gence nor breach of contract. However, the court also indicated that
plaintiff beneficiaries could have brought the action in either tort or
contract' ° and that lack of privity would be no bar. In so stating, the
97. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
98. Id. at 651, 320 P.2d at 19.
99. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
100. Id at 592, 364 P.2d at 689.
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court expressed its concern over the possibility of placing too great
a burden on the legal profession. Answering in the negative, it stated:
We are of the view that the extension of his liability to beneficiaries
injured by a negligently drawn will does not place an undue
burden on the profession, particularly when we take into con-
sideration that a contrary conclusion would cause the innocent
beneficiary to bear the loss.101
Thus, the doctrine of privity as it relates to professional negligence
was overthrown in California, at least insofar as future cases are found
to fit within the Biakanja-Lucas rationale and so-called "balancing
test. "102
As with any landmark decisions, Lucas and Biakanja produced a
rash of law review articles, 10 3 but since these decisions were handed
down there has not been a great deal of litigation on the matter. Only
two other states have expressly approved and followed the decisions. 10 4
Another jurisdiction, 0 5 by way of dicta, has indicated possible future
approval and adoption of the California rule. Still another'0 6 seemed
101. Id. at 589, 364 P.2d at 688. Though dicta, it was accepted as a rule of law.
102. 10 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 257, 263 (1970). The California Supreme Court again used
this balancing test in Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161 (1969).
103. 4 AIuz. L. REv. 100 (1962); 42 BOSTON U. L. REv. 256 (1962); 27 FORDHAM L.
REv. 290 (1958); 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 369 (1961); 72 HARv. L. REV. 380 (1958); 75 HARV.
L. REv. 620 (1962); 7 KAN. L. REv. 83 (1958); 22 MD. L. REv. 161 (1962); 34 RocKy MT. L.
REv. 388 (1962); 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 475 (1962); 14 STAN. L. REv. 580 (1962); 40
TExAs L. REv. 1046 (1962); 64 W. VA. L. REv. 361 (1962).
104. Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966). This court held at 225
A.2d 28, 29-30: "Liability for a negligent performance of a contract, or nonperformance
should be imposed where the injury to the plaintiff is foreseeable and where the contract
is an incident to an enterprise of the defendant and there are adequate reasons from
policy for imposing a duty of care to avoid the risk thus encountered, as an incident to the
enterprise." In Howarth v. Pfeifer, 443 P.2d 39, 42-43 (Alaska 1968), the Supreme Court
of Alaska, relying on the California decisions, remanded the case for the jury to consider
the various balancing factors of Biakanja in determining negligence of defendant.
105. Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969). This was an action against an ac-
countant for negligence, and the court indicated the California rule may be applicable
to attorneys, but, as to the case under consideration, it said:
This being a case of first impression in Iowa, we are disposed to reject the rule
that third parties not in privity of contract or in a fiduciary relationship are always
barred from recovery for negligence of the party issuing the instrument upon which
the third party relies, to his detriment. It is unnecessary at this time to determine
whether the rule of no liability should be relaxed to extend to all foreseeable persons
who may rely upon the report, but we do hold it should be relaxed as to those who
were actually known to the author as prospective users of the report and take into
consideration the end and aim of the transaction. Id. at 402-03.
See Stephens Industries, Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) explaining
the holding in Ryan.
106. Robinson v. Colebrook Guaranty Savings Bank, 109 N.H. 382, 254 A.2d 837 (1969).
But cf. Murray v. Bullard Co., 110 N.H. 220, 265 A.2d 309 (1970) where the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire cited Robinson as authority for the opinion that: "The common
law concept of privity is subject to extension, modification or extinction without legis-
lative aid, as the common law in its normal evolution may demand." Id. at 226, 265 A.2d
at 313.
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to approve the decisions, but was able to distinguish them on the facts
from the case under consideration. Lucas was specifically rejected by
the Supreme Court of New York in Maneri v. Amodeo 10 7 in 1963.
To date, there has been no Pennsylvania case directly in point on the
privity issue. One writer, however, has suggested that Pennsylvania
would extend the third party beneficiary concept in this area to grant
recovery. The commentator argues:
To mitigate the harshness of the privity requirement in such cases,
many courts have carved out an exception to the general rule by
extending the third party beneficiary concept. . . . Thus, an at-
torney may be liable to a third party relying on the search when
the client retained the attorney for the benefit of the third party
and this fact was known to the attorney. 08
The writer cited the case of Lawall v. Groman'0 9 as so holding. The
Lawall court, however, did not really address itself to the question of
privity of contract or the third party beneficiary concept. Instead, it
found that the relationship of attorney and client existed between the
plaintiff and defendant even though the plaintiff did not pay defen-
dant's fee, and that defendant owed a duty to plaintiff for the breach
of which he would be liable. If the court had not specifically found an
attorney-client relationship in Lawall, it could be argued that Penn-
sylvania would apply the same rationale as the California courts, basing
liability on the duty concept. However, the additional factor in Lawall
makes it difficult to know what the Pennsylvania courts will do with
similar cases in the future. On the basis of the reasoning by the Cali-
fornia courts, it does not seem unfair to find liability-at least in those
cases in which the attorney knows that the plaintiff is relying on his
conduct, where the harm to plaintiff is foreseeable, and where the
imposition of liability would not impose an unpredictable burden on
the members of the legal profession.
The whole area of privity contemplates the scope of one's duty to
others. The courts which have abandoned the privity rule in actions
107. 38 Misc. 2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1963).
108. Comment, supra note 13, at 1310.
109. 180 Pa. 532 (1897). Defendant-attorney had represented Lawall's brother in vari-
ous investments, and he notified his client to inform him of a good investment. His client
visited the property with him and defendant agreed to examine the title and search the
records for liens. Plaintiff had just come into some money and wanted to make an invest-
ment of $1,000.00, so plaintiff and her brother met defendant in his office. Defendant said
that he wanted to check the records once more. He later reported that plaintiff's mortgage
would be the first lien. Subsequently, it developed there were two prior liens of $700.00
and $300.00, respectively, and the property was not worth more than $1,200.00. Plaintiff's
suit was for $1,500.00.
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against attorneys have not held that attorneys will be liable to every
single person who is touched by their conduct or advice, but instead
the courts have placed limitations on the concept of duty, and have
held that liability is to be determined by consideration and application
of various "balancing" factors. As one writer has said: "There are to
be some limitations on liability. The lack of privity may no longer be
a valid defense but the concept of duty still has its limitations.' 10
One further problem in this area deserves brief mention. If lack of
privity will no longer bar an action by third parties against attorneys,
does this new concept alone protect such third parties, or may they
still be met with the defense of the statute of limitations? Suffice it to
say that in those jurisdictions which hold that the statute does not
begin to run until the injured party has discovered the negligence,
protection is afforded. But where the statute is held to begin to run at
the time of the negligent conduct, such action by third parties will most
likely fail."'
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The statute of limitations as it applies to legal malpractice actions
has been the subject of considerable discussion in legal periodicals as
well as judicial decisions in Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions.
The entire area of malpractice is relatively undefined by legislative
enactments, with the exception of the statute of limitations, the specific
time period of which varies from state to state. Three particular statutes
of populous states, those of Ohio, New York and California, were com-
pared in an article which pointed out a seemingly minor but significant
disparity in statutes of limitations, "the statute of limitations in legal
malpractice is three years in New York, two years in California, and
only one year in Ohio. '"" 2 In contrast, Pennsylvania has uniformly
held that the six-year statute of limitations set forth in the Act of March
27th, 1713 applies to a legal malpractice case." 3
In spite of the absence of extensive discussion concerning the ap-
plicability of the six year statute 4-that is, it has been assumed that
110. Averill, Jr., supra note 11, at 397.
111. In regard to the rule in Pennsylvania as to the time when the statute begins
to run, see the discussion accompanying notes 116-127, infra.
112. Baxter, supra note 4.
113. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (1953).
114. The only discussion was that in Skyline Builders, Inc. v. Kellar, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 19
(C. P. Lehigh Co. 1970) which mentions that the neglect of the attorney is a breach of
an implied contract between the attorney and the client:
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the statute appliesn'I-there has been a great deal of litigation in Penn-
sylvania concerning when the statute begins to run. A substantial
amount of this litigation has concerned cases in which attorneys have
failed to pay over to their client money which they have collected on
behalf of the client. In some cases, of course, this was done intentionally
or fraudulently rather than negligently. However, it seems the same
rule would apply as to the running of the statute of limitations whether
the failure to pay was fraudulent or negligent.
An early Pennsylvania case, McDowell v. Potter,"6 held that the
statute began to run when the client had notice of the attorney's re-
ceipt of the money. The burden was on the defendant-attorney to show
that notice had been given to the client-plaintiff, or, with reasonable
diligence the client-plaintiff would have learned of the receipt of the
money by the defendant-attorney. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
in the case of Campbell Adm'r v. Boggs,' 17 to some extent overruled
the McDowell rule."18
In Campbell the defendant was an attorney-in-fact rather than an
attorney-at-law, but the court held there was no ground for distinction
between the two."19 The Campbell court, in attempting to reconcile
the McDowell case with the facts in the case before it, noted that in
McDowell the plaintiff had alleged concealment of the receipt of the
money by the attorney. However, the Campbell court specifically stated:
If a client applies to his attorney and receives a false or evasive
answer as to monies collected, let him prove that, and it will arrest
the running of the statute; but if he can prove nothing to excuse
his delay suing, the statute must have its course, for it is founded
in wisdom. 20
In Pennsylvania, the default or malpractice of an attorney has been treated as a breach
of contract between attorney and client: Campbell's Administrator v. Boggs, 48 Pa.
524; Rhines' Administrators v. Evans, 66 Pa. 192; Huffman Estate (No. 3), 349 Pa.
59. The period of limitation to be applied to such action is six years: Acd of March
27, 1713, 1 Sm. L. 76, 12 P.S. § 31.
Supra at 20-21.
115. Schwab v. Cornell, 306 Pa. 536, 160 A. 449 (1932); Bodine v. Wayne Title & Trust
Co., 33 Pa. Super. 68 (1906); Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A. 98 (1897); Owen v.
Western Saving Fund, 97 Pa. 47, 39 A.R. 794 (1881); Moore v. Juvenal, 92 Pa. 484 (1880);
Stephens v. Downey, 53 Pa. 424 (1867); Fleming v. Culbert, 46 Pa. 498 (1864); McCoon
v. Galbraith, 29 Pa. 293 (1857); Downey v. Garard, 24 Pa. 52 (1854); McDowell v. Potter,
8 Pa. 189 (1848); Derrickson v. Cady, 7 Pa. 27 (1847).
116. 8 Pa. 189 (1848) [hereinafter cited as McDowell]; Derrickson v. Cady, 7 Pa. 27
(1847).
117. Campbell's Adm'rs. v. Boggs, 48 Pa. 524 (1855) [hereinafter cited as Campbell].
118. 8 Pa. 189 (1848).
119. 48 Pa. 524.
120. Id. at 526.
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Thus, in Campbell the burden was shifted from the defendant to the
plaintiff.
More broadly stated, the question is whether the statute begins to
run when the act of negligence occurs or, rather, when the injured
client becomes or should become aware of the negligent act or the
damage which he has suffered. So stated, the principle can be ap-
plied to virtually every legal malpractice situation. In a case de-
cided after Campbell, a partner in a law firm had collected money
on behalf of clients. The law firm later dissolved, and one of the for-
mer partners wrote to the clients expressing his ignorance of the case,
saying that he would find out what happened to the money. In de-
ciding the case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the statute began
to run at the time of the partner's letter to the clients on the theory
that the partner was charged with the knowledge that his former partner
had long before collected the money. His letter, therefore, was treated
as not revealing (i.e., fraudulently concealing) that knowledge when
called upon, and such action tolled the statute of limitations.1 1 In an
analogous situation where a conveyancer failed to notify the purchaser
of property of tax liens against the property, the court held that because
the conveyancer had sent a letter saying the title was free and clear,
the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the purchaser
received notice that his property had been sold at a tax sale. The court
reasoned that the letter acted as a fraudulent concealment of the actual
circumstances. 122 Schwab v. Cornell 23 effectively overruled previous
cases, which held that the statute began to run at the time of the neg-
ligent act by the conveyancer or title searcher. 24 The most clearly
reasoned case in this area is Skyline Builders, Inc. v. Kellar,125 decided
by a common pleas judge in Lehigh County.
The Skyline court analogized to the rule applicable in Pennsylvania
to physicians and architects12 6 in order to bring all malpractice actions
under the same rule. The reasoning was as follows:
121. McCoon v. Galbraith, 29 Pa. 293 (1857).
122. Schwab v. Cornell, 306 Pa. 536, 160 A. 449 (1932).
123. Id.
124. Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 A.98 (1897); Owen v. Western Saving Fund,
97 Pa. 47 (1881); Bodine v. Wayne Title & Trust Co., 33 Pa. Super. 68 (1906).
125. 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 19 (C. P. Lehigh Co. 1970).
126. Ayres v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959), where a surgeon left a sponge
in the patient's body and the statute did not begin to run until the sponge was discovered;
Med-Mar, Inc. v. Dilworth, 214 Pa. Super. 402, 257 A.2d 990 (1969), where an architect's
negligence was responsible for a defect in the roof and the statute did not begin to run
until the defect was discovered.
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The anomaly inherent in a strict application of the statute of
limitations in cases of legal malpractice is readily apparent. In
many instances, the client will be unaware of the attorney's neg-
ligence until loss or injury is actually threatened. If this negligence
is discovered for the first time after the expiration of the period
of limitation, a strict application of the statute will bar any action.
To deny a person a right before he can reasonably be expected to
know that he has such a right is unreasonable and unjust. More-
over, to impose upon the client the duty of ferreting out his lawyer's
mistakes, a burden which in the usual situation, can be met only
by employing a second attorney, is to discourage the trust and con-
fidence which are essential to a sound attorney-client relationship. 127
It therefore appears to be the rule in Pennsylvania that the statute
will begin to run upon the commission or omission which constitutes
negligence unless, because of the subsequent fraud of the attorney
(actual or constructive) or in spite of diligence on the part of the client,
the knowledge of the negligence or its consequences would not be
acquired until some period thereafter. In that case, the statute begins
to run from the time the negligent act of the attorney or its conse-
quences is or should be discovered by the client.
Whereas Pennsylvania courts have applied a uniform six-year statute
and defined its point of application, courts of other jurisdictions have
expanded their discussions to the question of whether the tort statute of
limitations or the contract statute of limitations should apply.128 The
cases are sometimes decided on the basis of the cause of action stated
in the complaint,129 while others are based upon the form of action.130
This difference has led to considerable discussion in law reviews con-
cerning the applicable statute.' 31 Obviously, in other jurisdictions, the
problem of which statute of limitations to apply will not be solved
immediately. Perhaps the solution awaits further legislative thought
on whether a malpractice suit is the same as any other cause of action
for negligence.
127. 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 19, 24-25 (C.P. Lehigh Co. 1970).
128. See Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 978 (1968) and Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 1216 (1956) and cases
cited in those annotations.
129. Bland v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W.2d 377 (1955).
130. Schrimer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 P. 265 (1930); Buchanan v. Huson,
39 Ga. App. 734, 148 S.E. 345 (1929).
131. Averill, Jr., supra note 11; Bastedo, A Note on Lawyers' Malpractice: Legal
Boundaries and Judicial Regulations, 7 OSCOODE HALL L.J. 311 (1969); Baxter, supra note
4; Coggin, supra note 4; Leavitt, The Attorney as Defendant, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1961);
Wade, supra 11; Comment, supra note 13; 15 HASTINGs L.J. 590 (1964)....
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DAMAGES
Assuming the client-plaintiff has sustained the burden of proof of
showing a negligent breach of duty on the part of the attorney-defen-
dant, the next question is whether the client suffered any damages as a
result of that negligent breach of duty. In addition to determining
whether damages have been proximately caused by an attorney's breach
of duty, it is also incumbent upon the court to determine how the dam-
ages are to be measured.
Probably the clearest case of determining the measure of damages oc-
curs where the attorney, by reason of his negligence, has failed to enter
judgment on a promissory note of a solvent debtor prior to the running
of the statute of limitations, thus barring the client from collection of
his debt. There is no question the client has suffered damages, or that
the damages were proximately caused by the negligence of the attorney,
and there is little question as to how those damages are to be measured.
However, in most cases the question of whether the client suffered
damages and the measure thereof is much more complex. Suppose, for
example, that the attorney in conducting a trial, based on a theory of
medical malpractice in which punitive damages were recoverable, failed
to object to irrelevant questions concerning an intimate relationship
which existed between the defendant-doctor and the plaintiff in the
malpractice case. Suppose the jury did not return a verdict for punitive
damages. Assuming that the failure to object was negligent, can the jury
in the action brought against the attorney for such negligence speculate
as to whether the previous jury would have awarded punitive damages
had evidence of that relationship been objected to properly and ex-
cluded by the court?
The first of the above hypotheticals has been litigated in Pennsyl-
vania. In Cox v. Livingston,132 the attorney gave Cox a receipt indi-
cating that he had received a note for collection drawn to the order of
the plaintiff by Dubbs. The same day, plaintiff swore to an affidavit
in support of his claim against Dubbs. Attorney Livingston died ap-
proximately six months after the date of the receipt, two terms of court
having elapsed from that date. The evidence revealed the possibility
that Livingston had not brought suit because Dubbs told him he would
have the money shortly and would pay the note. The lower court in-
structed the jury that if they believed the delay was caused by an honest,
132. 2 W. & S. 105 (Pa. 1841).
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but mistaken, error of judgment on the part of Mr. Livingston, their
verdict should be for the defendant. The jury found for the defendant.
On appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined there was noth-
ing in the evidence which revealed there was to be any discretion on
the part of Mr. Livingston as to when suit was to be brought on the
note. This determination, impliedly at least, indicates the court based
its finding on a theory of contract. 133 The court, having recited the
evidence, indicating it was the clear intention of the parties that such
discretion did not exist, stated:
The jury, therefore, ought to have been instructed by the court,
if they came to this conclusion, and we do not see well from the
evidence how they could have avoided it, that notwithstanding they
might think that Mr. Livingston had omitted to bring a suit, solely
with a view to promote the interest of the plaintiff, yet he had
violated his engagement with and failed to perform his duty to
the plaintiff, in not having brought and prosecuted a suit with
reasonable diligence for the recovery of the debt due to the plain-
tiff; and having thus failed to perform his duty, he had rendered
himself liable to pay the plaintiff, whatever of the debt might have
been recovered of Dubbs by suit having been so brought and
prosecuted, which Dubbs has now become unable to pay; and that
it was the duty of the jury to find a verdict in favour of the plain-
tiff for that sum, whatever they should think it was. But if from
the evidence they should be of the opinion, that a suit brought
against Dubbs would have been unavailing, and that nothing could
have been recovered by means of it, their verdict, though it ought
to still be for the plaintiff, should only be for nominal damages.
Under this view of the case, we think that the plaintiff ought to
have a new trial.134
The case was retried and again was taken to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. 35 One new fact appeared in the evidence in the subse-
quent case: suit was brought after Livingston's death by his partners
before the action was filediagainst Livingston's administrators. In the
meantime, however, Dubbs had become insolvent. The court, then,
specifically placed the case within the theory of contract actions. 186
The court stated:
133. This is further substantiated by the fact that in its opinion the court placed
printing emphasis, by means of italics, on the word "collection" in quoting the language
of the receipt given by Livingston. Id. at 104.
134. Id. at 106-07.
135. Livingston v. Cox, 6 Pa. 360 (1847).
136. "The weight of authority has put it beyond question that though the action may
be in form as for tort, yet if the subject of it be based on contract, the suit will be
attended by all the incidents of an action ex contractu .... " Id. at 362.
345
Duquesne Law Review
It is certainly true, that the measure of damages, in a case like the
present, is the actual loss sustained by the negligence of the at-
torney. But if the claim or debt intrusted to his professional care
for collection is not, through his neglect, collected or secured when
it might, and reasonably ought to have been; it will not do to say
this neglect is excused by the subsequent laches of the volunteer,
who possibly, by the exercise of extraordinary diligence, might
have made the debt from the wreck of a failing man's fortune.
Though this might have been possible, or even probable in the
particular case, it may still with truth be affirmed that the client
lost the opportunity of securing the amount due to him because
of the default of the first attorney, and has, therefore, suffered an
injury at his hands, commensurate with the debt due, should the
money eventually remain uncollected. 3 7
The court placed the burden upon the defendant-attorney to show
that the plaintiff, because of his own lack of diligence, was not entitled
to damag,.' 38 Whether this is a theory of contributory negligence
which the defendant, in any negligence action, has the burden to prove
is discussed later. 139
Hence, while the Livingston court, in dealing with this factual
situation the first time, 40 specifically held that it would be necessary
for the plaintiff-client to show damages would have been recoverable,
it does not appear in the second opinion' 4' that the court requires
proof the judgment was collectable against the debtor. The only factor
added in the second suit is that the suit was brought later by one of
the partners.
An even stronger position against the defendant-attorney prevailed
in Miller v. Wilson. 42 In Miller the plaintiff had judgments against
property belonging to her sisters. The husband of one of her sisters
undertook to pay the judgments through his bond to be secured by a
mortgage, if the plaintiff would satisfy the judgments. The defendant-
attorney was hired and paid to prepare the papers, satisfy the judg-
ments with a power of attorney and record the mortgage. He satisfied
137. Id. at 365.
138. A case may, indeed, be imagined in which the first attorney, though negligent
of his duty, might not be liable beyond nominal damages, as for instance, when the
plaintiff employed another agent or neglected to employ one after due notice of
the death of the first, and the defendant continued, undoubtedly, solvent for a period
sufficiently long to allow the collection of the money due by the exercise of ordinary
diligence.
id. at 366.
139. See discussion accompanying notes 170-173.
140. 2 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841).
141. 6 Pa. 360 (1847).
142. 24 Pa. 114 (1854).
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the judgments but failed to record the mortgage until after other liens
had been entered against the property. The plaintiff's brother-in-law
became insolvent and the only security she had was his worthless bond.
The defendant-attorney argued that the plaintiff had not yet suffered
any actual loss. The court held, however, that the defendant did not
merely become a surety on the plaintiff's brother-in-law's bond but
subjected himself to an immediate action. The court said that on a
contract, each time there is a breach of an installment, there may be a
suit for what is due at the time a suit is brought; however, this was a
tort, and the duty or promise had been breached and the plaintiff was
entitled to full compensation for that breach. The court stated, "a
case directly in point is that of Howell v. Young .... It was held, [in
Howell] that in an action against the attorney, the client might recover
for all the probable loss he was likely to sustain from the invalidity of
the security.' 143 (Emphasis in original.)
Although the court reasoned that the plaintiff was entitled to the
security of mind which the mortgage gave her, there is some indication
the plaintiff might have been entitled to a verdict even if the brother-
in-law had remained solvent. In discussing the measure of damages
the court held that plaintiff was entitled to "the difference in value
between her debt made absolutely safe by a mortgage, and the same
debt with no security except the personal responsibility of an insolvent
man."'144 It would seem proper, therefore, to substitute the word "sol-
vent" for "insolvent" to comport to the factual situation of a solvent
debtor on an unsecured debt and, since the jury was to determine
that difference in value in the Miller case, the jury could just as adroitly
determine the difference in value if the debtor had remained solvent.
In spite of the Miller court's determination that the plaintiff was
entitled to full recovery in this suit on a tort theory, the decision is not
in conflict with the language of the court in Livingston v. Cox.145
Miller, it should be noted, also approved the affirmative answer of the
lower court concerning the defendant-attorney being bound, by con-
tract, to record the mortgage. It would appear from an analysis of the
three preceding cases, therefore, that while the statute of limitations
is to be determined upon a theory ex contractu ' 46 in Pennsylvania the
143. Id. at 121.
144. Id. at 122.
145. 6 Pa. 360 (1847). See note 136, supra.
146. See also, discussion accompanying notes 112-15.
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right of action and the measure of damages are to be determined on
a theory ex delicto.
Because of their approach to the measure of damages issue, the
Pennsylvania courts have not been squarely faced with one problem
that has confronted other courts. Other jurisdictions have faced the
question whether the measure of damages should be based upon a
theory of contract limited by the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale,'47 or
whether the measure of damages should be in tort limited by the rule
of proximate cause in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.14 The latter is
perhaps less restrictive, being based on the reasonably prudent man
doctrine, whereas the former, being subjective, is somewhat limiting.149
Though the cases discussed above do not decide this point, the lan-
guage of the court in the Cox v. Livingston case' 50 clearly brings
Pennsylvania within the majority rule which holds that the plaintiff-
client must prove that damages would have been recovered by him were
in not for the negligence of the defendant-attorney. 15' While this may
seem a hardship on the plaintiff-client, it would certainly be an injus-
tice to permit the plaintiff-clients to recover without such proof. The
very real problem, which exists where the attorney has failed to bring
the original action, is that the jury in the case against the attorney
must determine what a jury would have done in the original action.
The same type of problem exists in a different context where the at-
torney has failed to file an appeal prior to the expiration of the time
limit.1 52 There, the court must determine the likely outcome of the
appeal.
One case dealing with the measure of damages other than a liqui-
dated debt is Bodine v. Wayne Title & Trust Co.153 which, though
not involving an attorney, certainly involves an analogous situation.
Presumably the rule announced there would apply to cases of attorney
malpractice. The defendant had been hired to search a title and
failed to uncover a covenant under which the previous owner had
agreed to erect fences. The court held that the measure of damages
was the cost to keep and maintain a good and substantial fence as
required by the covenant plus the cost of the original construction of
147. 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
148. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
149. See discussion in Coggin, supra note 4, at 232-33.
150. 2 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1941). See text accompanying note 134, supra.
151. Coggin, supra note 4 and cases cited therein; Comment, supra note 13, at 1307-08;
Leavitt, supra note 131, at 28-29; Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 62 (1956).
152. Note, Attorney's Negligence: The Belated Appeal, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 141 (1967).
153. 33 Pa. Super. 68 (1906).
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the fence, stating: "If from want of proper knowledge, from a failure
to use proper means, or from carelessness in applying those means to
the matter in hand, loss results to his client, the failure is his and he
will be responsible."' 154 In Bodine the court talked in language sound-
ing in tort, and clearly applied an ex delicto measure of damages.
There has been one case in Pennsylvania in which a court has recog-
nized several of the various rules of law applicable to legal malpractice
actions-both those previously recognized in Pennsylvania, and those
announced in other jurisdictions. 15 5 In Woods v. Reading Trust Co., 56
defendant's decedent, an attorney, failed to file suit on behalf of plain-
tiffs within the two year statute of limitations for personal injury ac-
tions. The wife-plaintiff had been a guest passenger and suffered
personal injuries when the car in which she was riding came into
contact with a portion of the right-of-way of a traction company, which
was alleged to be improperly constructed. The accident happened on
April 28th, 1929, and there was evidence that defendant's decedent
was hired sometime prior to February 20th, 1931, and was paid a re-
tainer of one hundred dollars. Plaintiffs alleged damages in the mal-
practice case totalling $20,000. The trial court permitted an amendment
to the statement of claim at the trial which added, as an element of
damages, the sum of $2,350 for household expenses "made necessary by
the accident." The court cited Waln v. Beaver,'5' to the effect that an
attorney is liable for losses sustained by his client which flow from his
negligence and stated: "The test of the attorney's liability is negligence,
not gross negligence.' 15
The trial court had charged that an attorney does not have a duty
to prosecute a groundless or fruitless claim. If he believes it to be
groundless, however, an attorney must inform his client within such
time as will allow the client to hire another attorney.
It is clear the court in the Woods case spoke in terms which indicate
a theory ex delicto and impliedly approved a measure of damages which
sounds in tort. Unfortunately, the court failed to address itself to a
question raised by the defendant which would have had a direct effect
on damages in the case. The defendant raised the question as to
whether a release issued to a joint tortfeasor with the intended defen-
154. Id. at 75.
155. See, e.g., discussion accompanying note 188.
156. 26 Berks County L.J. 115 (1934).
157. 161 Pa. 605 (1894).
158. 26 Berks County L.J. 115, 118 (1934).
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dant, against whom the attorney was hired to bring suit, would act as
a release of the intended defendant. His argument was that if the re-
lease were operative, it would have barred the action against the attorney,
because there would be no damages allowable to a plaintiff who had
released the intended defendant. It does not appear why the court did
not address itself to this issue. The reason for a new trial based on the
release was dismissed on the ground that while it had been raised as
evidence which was acquired after the trial, the defendant could have
discovered the fact of the release before trial by use of the knowledge
which defendant had at that time.
Thus, the client who proves actionable negligence will recover only
nominal damages unless he proves actual loss proximately caused by
that negligence. The loss will be measured in the same manner as the
damages in the client's lost claim would have been measured.
DEFENSES
In addition to the statute of limitations'5 9 and standing 6" to recover
issues, an attorney can raise a number of defenses that may effectively
limit his liability for negligent conduct. As will be seen, Pennsylvania
courts have not clearly defined limits specifically in terms of available
defenses. However, there has been some general discussion of defenses
as restricted, of course, by the particular factual situations under con-
sideration.
Contributory Negligence
As in any negligence action, the defense of contributory negligence
will never be reached if the original negligence is found not actionable.
For example, it has been said as to negligence in litigation that "the de-
fense of contributory negligence of the client is seldom an important
factor in attorney negligence cases for the simple reason that, as a rule,
the entire responsibility for conducting the original litigation is en-
trusted to the defendant. . . ."'l' However, there are cases in which con-
tributory negligence will be an important factor. It would seem that
when a client has some affirmative duty in regard to the legal matter or
litigation in question, his contributory negligence could come into play
159. See discussion accompanying notes 112-131.
160. See discussion accompanying notes 73-111.
161. Coggin, supra note 4, at 233.
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in a subsequent negligence action against his attorney. For example, in
another jurisdiction where an attorney was employed to defend an action
against his client, and the client failed to furnish his attorney with
information which was vital to the defense of his case, 62 it was held
that contributory negligence could be a bar to recovery. against the
attorney. So also the doctrine has been applied where the client mis-
represents facts in regard to a particular available defense.16 Further-
more, a client has been held grossly negligent for failing to inqui-e
about the disposition of certain money which his attorney collected for
him.1' One court 6 5 stated that contributory negligence would be avail-
able to a negligent attorney when his client "chose to disregard" his
legal advice. In analogizing to medical malpractice cases in which con-
tributory negligence is an available defense, the court said:
[T]here would seem to be no reason whatever why the same rule
should not be applicable in a legal malpractice action where there
is evidence that a client chose to disregard the legal advice of his
attorney. In our opinion, any other rule would be grossly unfair. 66
Thus, other jurisdictions seem to say that where a client misinforms
his attorney, refuses to cooperate, withholds information or evidence,
or fails to follow his attorney's advice, he may effectively be confronted
with the defense of contributory negligence. However, when a client
merely acquiesces in the conduct of his attorney, the defense should
not be available unless the client himself is an attorney. 67
In the Pennsylvania case of Cox v. Livingston,6 8 the plaintiff em-
ployed Livingston to bring suit for collection of a debt from one Dubbs.
Livingston neglected to bring suit, and approximately six months later
he died. Suit eventually was filed by Cox against Livingston's admin-
istrators. After Livingston's death, and prior to the action against
Livingston's administrators, suit was instituted against Dubbs by Liv-
ingston's partner. However, by this time Dubbs had become insolvent.
In the action against Livingston's administrators, defendant argued
that if Cox, after the death of Livingston, had diligently pursued his
claim by immediately hiring another attorney to sue Dubbs, the debt
162. Salisbury v. Gourgas, 51 Mass. 442 (1845).
163. Rapuzzi v. Stetson, 160 App. Div. 150, 145 N.Y.S. 455 (1914).
164. Simpson v. Dalziel, 135 Cal. 599, 67 P. 1080 (1902).
165. Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1961).
166. Id. at 150, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 866. However, the court held there was no contributory
negligence as a matter of law where a client failed to ask his attorney about acknowledg-
ment or recording of a chattel mortgage.
167. Carr's Ex'rx. v. Glover, 70 Mo. App. 242 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1897).
168. 2 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841).
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could have been collected prior to Dubbs' insolvency. The jury found
for the defendant in Cox, but on the basis of error in the jury instruc-
tions on another issue,169 plaintiff was granted a new trial. Thus, in
Livingston v. Cox,17 0 the question of the plaintiff's diligence was again
in issue. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, while not speaking in
terms of "contributory negligence," said that defendant-attorney had
the burden of showing that plaintiff, because of his own lack of dili-
gence, was not entitled to damages. The court said:
A case may, indeed, be imagined in which the first attorney, though
negligent of his duty, might not be liable beyond nominal damages,
as for instance, when the plaintiff employed another agent or ne-
glected to employ one after due notice of the death of the first, and
the defendant continued, undoubtedly, solvent for a period suf-
ficiently long to allow the collection of the money due by the exer-
cise of ordinary diligence."'
The court appeared to apply a theory of contributory negligence in
Livingston not to bar recovery (since the court placed the case within
the theory of contract actions)'17 2 but to reduce damages. 73
A contributory negligence theory has been used by defendant-attor-
neys in other Pennsylvania cases (hereinafter discussed), although no
case contains a discussion of contributory negligence as such. In two
cases, for example, 74 the defendant-attorney contended that the plain-
tiff could not now claim damages since, even after he was aware of the
conduct which he later alleged to be negligence, he continued to employ
and pay the attorney. The court in Enterline v. Miller 75 rejected this
defense because it found the attorney had continually assured the plain-
tiff that matters were proceeding in a regular manner. However, in
Derrickson v. Cady 76 the court held the jury should have been in-
169. See discussion accompanying notes 133-134.
170. 6 Pa. 360 (1847).
171. Id. at 366.
172. See discussion accompanying notes 136-137.
173. The court, however, held that plaintiff could collect the full amount of the debt
even though diligence, after knowledge of the death of Livingston, might have recovered
the debt for him. The court said:
When the first neglect is established, it will not do to turn the plaintiff round upon
the allegation that success might have attended a subsequent exercise of stringent
diligence, or to hold him to strict proof of the precise moment when insolvency
overwhelmed the original defendant.
6 Pa. 360, 366 (1847). Thus, did the defendant fail to prove contributory negligence, or did
the court simply reject this defense as placing an undue burden upon plaintiff under these
circumstances?
174. Derrickson v. Cady, 7 Pa. 27 (1847); Enterline v. Miller, 27 Pa. Super. 463 (1905).
175. 27 Pa. Super. 463, 470 (1905).
176. 7 Pa. 27 (1847).
352
Vol. 10: 317, 1972
Professional Liability of Lawyers in Pennsylvania
structed on the fact that the client continued to employ the attorney
even after he was aware of the conduct which he later claimed to be
negligence or lack of judgment of the attorney. 177
In still two other cases, 78 involving suits against attorneys for money
collected by them for plaintiffs, defendants claimed that they were not
liable because no demand had been made for the money 79 and no in-
quiry had been made. 80 In Krause v. Dorrance'8' the court said it
would allow the defense of no demand except when,
[T]he attorney has been guilty of fraud or malpractice, or of culpa-
ble negligence in not giving notice of the receipt of the money in a
reasonable time; or when he puts in a sham plea for delay; or when
he exhibits a manifest desire to baffle the plaintiff, and withhold
from him his just demand. (Emphasis added.) 8 2
Although this language indicates that only an intentional act of fraud
by the defendant-attorney will excuse plaintiff's failure to make a de-
mand, it seems significant that proof of defendant's "malpractice"
would create an exception to the general rule requiring a demand.
Thus, the effectiveness of this defense in a malpractice action is not
clear. But it would seem the language of Krause, referring to "mal-
practice," comports with the supposition that the same rule applies
whether the failure to pay over money is fraudulent or negligent.8 8
An important factor to remember in relation to the defense of con-
tributory negligence is the nature of the action. If the action is ex
delicto, evidence of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff
may completely bar recovery, while it will operate only to reduce
damages if the action is ex contractu.
Release
In Derrickson v. Cady, 84 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered
an action against an attorney for money received. The court held that
an agreement between client and attorney releasing the client from
177. Id. at 33.
178. Auge v. Darlington, 185 Pa. 111, 39 A. 845 (1898); Krause v. Dorrance, 10 Pa. 462
(1849).
179. Krause v. Dorrance, 10 Pa. 462 (1849).
180. Auge v. Darlington, 185 Pa. 111, 39 A. 845 (1898); The court held that because
plaintiff did not disaffirm defendant's act, she had ratified it.
181. 10 Pa. 462 (1849).
182. Id. at 464.
183. See discussion pp. 323-24, supra.
184. 7 Pa. 27 (1847).
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attorney's fees and stating by the client "I do hereby release him" acted
as a release by the client of any possible negligence claim for an error
in judgment on the part of the attorney.
Others
Several jurisdictions have considered the defense of illegality, 85 and
one has indicated by way of dictum that an attorney can avoid liability
if he can show that the original defendant would have been unable
to satisfy the judgment.1 6 The case of Woods v. Reading Trust Co.'8 7
also raised the possible defense of the insolvency of the intended de-
fendant where the attorney has failed to file suit within the period of
the statute of limitations. There, in support of a motion for judgment
n.o.v., the defendant raised the defense. The plaintiffs had introduced
evidence to the effect that the assets of the intended defendant, a trac-
tion company, exceeded its liabilities for three years after the year in
which the accident occurred. The court held it could not state as a
matter of law that a verdict against the traction company, had suit
been brought within the statute, would not be recoverable by the plain-
tiffs, and, since the defendant had not introduced any evidence as to
the solvency of the traction company, the question was properly one
for the jury. The jury had returned a verdict for plaintiffs. Thus, while
the court recognized the defense, it was held not applicable.
CONCLUSION
Admittedly, the foregoing article necessarily leaves some unanswered
questions in regard to the professional liability of Pennsylvania lawyers.
However, the courts have spoken clearly on some issues, and at least
have provided guidelines for future legal malpractice cases. For ex-
ample, we know the six year statute of limitations will apply to such
actions, and that the statute will begin to run at the time of the neg-
ligent act unless the client can show fraud or an act of negligence which,
could not have been discovered through diligence until some future
185. Goodman 8c Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482 (1857), held that part of a contract
of employment was champertous was not a good defense to an action for negligence of an
attorney in attempting to collect on a note. Morris v. Muller, 113 N.J.L. 46, 172 A. 63
(1934), held that if defendant was illegally practicing law and plaintiff knew it, he could
not recover.
186. Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 670-71, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98, 106 (1960).
187. 26 Berks County L.J. 115 (1934).
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time. In the latter case the statute begins to run at the time of discovery,
or at the time when the negligence should have been discovered.
Furthermore, it is clear that an attorney is bound to the standard
of ordinary care and skill common to members of the profession. He
has a duty to be familiar with well-settled principles of law and the
rules of practice frequently used in the ordinary business of the pro-
fession. There are no Pennsylvania decisions indicating whether an
attorney has a duty to be familiar with foreign law, but it would not
seem unfair to impose such a duty when he is employed to handle a
case involving conflicts of law questions. Similarly, he should have a
duty to familiarize himself with federal rules of procedure when it
might be advantageous to his case to proceed in the federal courts. Al-
though the Pennsylvania courts have not addressed these last two issues,
we can assume that no less than ordinary diligence would be expected
of an attorney employed to handle such actions.
The courts have encouraged the use of expert testimony by a defen-
dant-attorney to show that what he did was proper, except where the
standard of care is clearly a question of law for the court. Of course,
if the client is able to prove actionable negligence, he will still recover
only nominal damages unless he proves actual loss proximately caused
by that negligence. It is clear that such loss will be measured in the
same manner as the damages in the client's original claim would have
been measured.
All of the above issues are reached, of course, only after it has been
determined that the plaintiff is a proper party-plaintiff, i.e., that he is the
one to whom defendant owed a duty, or that lack of privity will not
bar his action. As we earlier pointed out, the privity question in Penn-
sylvania is still to be determined, but the trend in other jurisdictions
is to allow suits by third parties when harm to them was foreseeable,
and this seems to be a proper rule.
Fortunately, as will be noted by an examination of the footnotes in
this article, a great majority of the actions for legal malpractice in
Pennsylvania, which have been discovered, occurred prior to 1900. As
was stated in Lynch v. Commonwealth ex rel. Barton: "Although,
extensive authority has been exercised by the attorneys, we have had
few cases of complaint, and the court has seldom been called on to
state the limits of their authority, or of their responsibility to their
clients: a circumstance highly honorable to the profession.' 88
188. 16 S. & R. 367, 368 (Pa. 1827).
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 1827 concluded:
If a plaintiff wishes his attorney to have less power than is usually
exercised, it would seem more consonant to right to give him in
writing a special and limited authority .... As between the client
and the attorney, I would, however, say the responsibility of the
latter is as great and as strict here as in any country; I mean, where
want of good faith, or attention to the cause is alleged; but in the
exercise of the discretionary power usually exercised, I would not
hold an attorney liable, where he acted honestly, and in a way he
thought was for the interest of his client. 89
And we so conclude.
189. Id. at 368-69.
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